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Redefining “Otherness” from Northern Thailand
Introduction: Notes Towards Debating
Multiculturalism in Thailand and Beyond
H6N6B> Yoko
Multiculturalism has not been on Thailand’s official agenda. Thailand has been known
as a homogeneous country, or rather, homogeneity had been incessantly stressed in
official and other discourse while repressing differences, in the process of nation-building
throughout the twentieth century. Those who do not fit into the narrowly defined
“Thai-ness” have therefore been deemed “others” and outsiders, threats to the unity of the
homogeneously conceived nation. For most of the twentieth century, approach to
difference had been fundamentally assimilationist. As Renard points out in his paper in
this issue, Thailand’s stress on homogeneity or non-recognition of its own diversity
stands out among countries in the region. The socialist regimes on Mainland Southeast
Asia all officially recognize their diversity numerically. Vietnam counts , Myanmar
, and Laos in between  to  [Vatthana 		: 
] nationalities or ethnic groups.
Thailand too has always been culturally and ethnically diverse. While diversity itself is
unquestionable, the question is how the diversity and differences have been managed. In
the recent relationship between the state and minorities in the North, we seem to find
increasing recognition towards diversity. The evolving process over more than a
century, the nature of the recent recognition of differences, and the varied responses from
those “others” towards the process in “negotiating identities” is what we will address in
this special issue.
This collection of papers is the outcome of a panel session at the th International
Thai Studies Meeting held at Northern Illinois University in April 		.) The papers are
by scholars who have conducted long-term fieldwork in Northern Thailand, one historian
and four anthropologists. The paper by historian Renard looks at the definition of Thai
and Thainess from the center from early twentieth century, seeking how Thailand
launched into this homogeneous discourse. Looking at how the self becomes defined
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allows us to pursue how the “others” were defined. The paper by Kwanchewan discusses
the Tribal Research Institute, the instrument of assimilationist policy towards the hill
minorities. The remaining three papers deal with specific groups of “others” as defined
by the hegemonic “self”: the elderly in Tai Lue society (Baba); the over-land Chinese Chiin
Haw (Wang); and Karen (Hayami). All in one way or another deal with how “Others”
versus Self have been defined and are now being re-defined in Thai society.
As an introduction to these papers, I will discuss the recent trends in Thailand from
the point of view of the institutional changes, and try to lay out the present orientation
towards difference and diversity in Northern Thailand. In doing so, I find it useful to take
up “multiculturalism” as the key concept. It may seem contrived to talk about multi-
culturalism in a country where it has never been professed in official discourse, yet, much
of what is happening in Thailand, especially the North seems to be most pertinent to the
debates critiquing western liberal multiculturalism. These arguments might therefore
give us some clues towards thinking about the issue in Thailand. The process taking
place in Thailand is relevant in contexts in other parts of Southeast Asia. If there is
increasing recognition of diversity and difference, in what contexts is that taking place?
What does it mean for the “Others” to be thus “recognized”? And ultimately, how can we
talk about multiculturalism in Thailand in a way satisfactory to all parties involved?

The process of nation-building in Thailand has been one of delineating and defining
Thainess versus Otherness both within and across its boundaries. “Others” here might
include not only the more obvious national and ethnic others, but also those whose
various loci of identity (religious, sexual, or occupational, etc.) are marginalized in the
normative social order. Such delineation and redefinition have undergone changes at
different points in the nation-building, especially in the past decade.
The original impetus for organizing the panel at the Thai Studies Meetings was the
dissolution of the Tribal Research Institute in . Established in  as the Tribal
Research Centre during the times of communist insurgency and opium production in the
hills, TRI had been the center for implementing various development projects towards
the “hill tribes” to deal with these problems. The hill tribes (chaw khaw) were problems
to be dealt with and ultimately to be either assimilated or expelled outside the Thai
territory. In the Administrative Reform Act of , however, the Tribal Research
Institute of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare was dissolved. The questions raised
were: does TRI’s dissolution mean that the government no longer considered the “hill
tribes” as problematic, and/or, did they evaluate their assimilationist policies as having
been completed successfully? What is actually happening in the hills today seems to be,
in some ways, contradictory. On the one hand the hill-dwellers have come to show far
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more readiness to adopt state-initiated projects including agricultural innovations, edu-
cation, health-related programs, etc. Yet in many cases they have been prompted by
those very government agents to also maintain ethnic representations and displays.
Even if it seems that they no longer pose serious threats and problems to the state, from
their perspective, they have yet many problems they want the state to solve, such as
citizenship and land rights, and they at times resort to conscious self-representation of
difference as a strategic way to claim them. State magnanimity admitting their benign
differences could simply be a way to appease them in the face of such problems.
The fact that the museum, now placed under the Tourist Authority is left as a legacy
of the TRI seems to be quite telling of the kinds of difference the state is ready to
promote. What used to be a small one-room display in the building of the TRI was moved
in  to occupy a four-story building beside a scenic lake on the outskirts of Chiang
Mai. Jonsson analyses the narrative behind the layout. On the lowest floor is a display
of the hill-tribe traditional material cultures, and the successful development efforts by
the government, bringing “occupational, social, educational, and moral development” to
the backwards and ecologically destructive peoples, commemorating Thai society’s
commitment to progress. Then there is the second floor which introduces hill tribes and
Buddhism, and the top floor, demonstrating the King’s benevolence and the hill people’s
trust towards him [Jonsson : 	]. The museum today also sponsors language and
culture classes for the minorities to learn their own languages. Thus it is a juxtaposition
of preservation of cultural difference (as demonstrated in the display of objects) on the
one hand, and state’s self-congratulating itself on attaining development and moderniza-
tion among them in the face of their backwardness. Here we find a similar process as
those that have been discussed in other parts of Southeast Asia such as Indonesia. State
promotion of local arts and performances, and misrecognition of “culture” have had the
effect of reducing local culture into performance and display [Acciaioli 
]. I come back
to this below.
In place of the overall disinterest in the cultures of the others, and the eagerness to
assimilate and incorporate them into the national developmental effort, now there is this
attempt to define their culture as part of a benign recognition of difference. Meanwhile,
up in the hills, former “tribal” villages are now putting up public displays of their own
cultures in juxtaposition with displays of themselves as proper Thai citizens, such as in
sports festivals [Jonsson ], rituals and performances (Baba this issue), or eco-tourism
(Hayami this issue), by their own initiative or in response to administrative prompting.
The TRI dissolution was only a very small part of an overall administrative re-
shuffle in  under Thaksin. Another small part was the founding of the Ministry of
Culture. The Ministry’s foundation can be traced back more than half a century. The
institutional basis for promoting Thai culture as the basis of a civilized nation against the
threat of foreign powers had been founded earlier in the twentieth century, with
emphasis on the three national pillars of nation, religion and monarchy. It was in 	
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under Phibun, that the National Culture Council was established under the Culture Act,
to consolidate the policies that began with the various decrees (rathaniyom) since ,
most of which had to do with civilizing the appearance of the Thai nation such as dress
and manners of the people. Also under Phibun, the Ministry of Culture was founded in
, but together with the NCC, both were abolished when Sarit took over in 
[Connors ].) Subsequently under the threat of communist insurgency, Buddhism and
the kingship was further stressed as the linchpin of Thai culture and citizenship. In 	,
the National Cultural Commission was founded in the Ministry of Education, to promote
unity of Thai culture in this vein. With the end of cold war and struggle in Indochina,
from the s into the s, power shifted from the military to business and politics.
“Thainess” became open to contestation, and the various waves of recognizing Thainess
in varied locations and stress on local cultures began. Culture seems to have been handed
to the people and their localities.
The Ministry of Culture was founded in  within the same Administrative Reform
as that which brought the dissolution of TRI. Upon the foundation of the ministry, a
seminar of administrators and academics was held titled “Vision of Thai Culture,” an
official in charge of drawing up a master plan noted that “culture is plural in Thailand”
[ibid.: ]. The resulting plan of  endorsed the politics of diversity, acknowledging
more than  ethnic groups each one having its own characteristics and culture. With a
change in the minister, after 
 there was further emphasis on culture as “capital” for
economic and social development, facilitating both the commercial uses of culture as well
as regional and provincial demands for promoting local cultures. As Connors points out,
since the s, the issue of “Thai-ness” has changed its nature. “The question now is how
culture and identity forms can be used to articulate local cultures, multiple ethnic
identities and national identity into a Thai-ness for the global age” [ibid.: 

].
Section  of the 	 Constitution  ) states that “all persons are equal before the law
and shall enjoy equal protection under the law. . . . Men and women shall enjoy equal
rights. . . . Unjust discrimination against a person on the grounds of the difference in
origin, race, language, sex, age, physical or health condition, personal status, economic or
social standing, religious belief, education or constitutionally political view, shall not be
permitted.” Under this Constitution, it would seem possible that Thailand might declare
itself a multicultural society, by guaranteeing that its people will not face discrimination
based on such differences as noted.
The King’s first royal address to the newly inaugurated Prime Minister Thaksin’s
 Much of the information on the Ministry of Culture in this and the next paragraph were
drawn from Connors [].
 Just as I am writing this introduction, on the night of September th , a Coup d’Etat
by military personnel has overthrown the Thaksin government. The 	 Constitution has






cabinet on Feb. ,  stated that the Thai nation “comprises people from various parts
of the country. They differ in thoughts and ways of life. Their home topographies are
different. So are their standings. . . . One of the problems that the government will face
concerns the people who have long been living in our country but are not yet considered
Thai. . . . They were born in Thailand. They have been living in Thailand. But they
haven’t received the benefits of being Thai citizens. This matter must be handled
without discrimination.” ) All of this suggests that Thailand has become more accepting
of cultural differences. Is it the maturity of the nation state that now Thailand’s
constitution could admit its internal differences, or is it a change in the nature of the
difference thus acknowledged? As according to Appadurai, “the mobilization of markers
of group difference may itself be part of a contestation of values about difference”
[Appadurai : ]. Difference has itself come to mean something else.
Indeed, there has been significant interest in cultural diversity on multiple levels in
the past two decades. The interest in regional cultures such as in Isaan or Lanna cultures
can be seen, for example, in recent cultural revival of the North since the celebration of
the th Lanna year. There is much interest in these regions also in pop cultures
including food and music [Jory ]. Chinese cultural elements have also appeared in
the media, especially TV dramas. Another wave was the interest in local cultures of rural
communities. Since the 	s, and the community culture movement, the true Thai
tradition and wisdom were to be located in the local communities. There was also
expansion of interest into areas adjacent to the Thai national borders as those hitherto
inaccessible regions in Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar and Southern China were opened up to
visitors since the latter 	s and the beginning of the s. In these regions many
Tai-speaking peoples resided, and interest in Thainess/Tainess spurred explorations into
these areas from Thailand, commercial, academic, tourist etc. Finally, with the expansion
of the domestic tourist market, state interest in tourism has expanded not only to the
regional and provincial cultures, but also to the hills and other minorities. The diversity
of cultures has become a cultural resource, yet, the difference as presented as cultural
resource is often a standardized and homogenized version acceptable to the state. Thai
Culture and History as viewed from the center have been reviewed and interest in local
histories and cultures was advocated. With the alleviated pressure on security especially
in the border areas, there has been more space for the display of differences. Administra-
tive decentralization also opened paths for local initiatives. Plus, against the background
of economic development, difference has become an economic resource and the move has
been towards commercialization. Is the Thai state then ready to recognize diversity
within?
 Cited in Norman Vasu [
].
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
Multiculturalism has claimed the plurality of cultures as a way to counter the assimila-
tionist tendencies of majority society and culture, but at the same time most often its
effectiveness has been recognized and encouraged in terms of managerial policy or
administrative norm. By multiculturalism we generally refer to the attitude of welcom-
ing diversification of culture and society positively, and arguments pertaining to multi-
culturalism emerge as a discourse concerning the state and the formal aspects of state
and society. It has also come to represent the magnanimous attitude towards minorities
by those majority civilians whose own authenticity is unquestionable. From the point of
view of the status quo, multiculturalism replaces the counter-narratives of oppositional
politics deemed destructive to its maintenance. By calling all kinds of cultural strategy
etc. “multiculturalism,” or by recognizing differences on display, it could tame and
domesticate the critical sharpness of certain counter-narratives of identity politics,
glossing over outcries from minorities demanding their rights as citizens. We need, then,
to question the nature of the difference claimed in the diversity allowed to coexist in the
claim.
In their discussion of multiculturalism in Asia, Baogang He and Will Kymlicka point
out that Asian countries are now in intense search of new alternative ways of con-
ceptualizing state-minority relations. These draw upon a variety of traditions such as
pre-colonial centre-periphery relations, European colonial practices of legal pluralism and
indirect rule, and socialist theories of national liberation and self-determination, etc. On
top of these today what many countries have come to draw upon as model for the
democratic negotiation of diversity is the emerging models of multicultural citizenship,
and human and minority rights in the international discourse: a way to manage ethnic
diversity within the bounds of peaceful and democratic politics without jeopardizing the
basic security and prosperities of the society [He and Kymlicka : ].
In Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar, ethnic/national differences are abundantly used in
the state propaganda. The diversity is portrayed in posters, billboards, various media,
postage stamps, and currencies. As Jonsson and Taylor point out for Vietnam, “particular
ways of imagining and experiencing diversity” are thus sanctioned [: ]. Signifiers
of local identity is appropriated by the nation state for its hegemonic process of moder-
nity and progress [ibid.: ]. In these settings it is not so much that cultural diversity is
accommodated, but rather, the state’s project of national integration is celebrated and
propagandized by demonstrating the diversity. Vatthana, arguing for Laos where
difference is equally emphasized in propaganda, denies the possibility of liberal multi-





More widely, the western brand of liberal multiculturalism has been critiqued over
the years for its own contradictions. The contradiction is that encouraging multicultural-
ism enhances the generality and normativeness of the common culture. State recognition
of ethnic groups is itself a form of state control of its marginal peoples, and furthermore,
culture becomes an economic resource such as in the tourist industry. Thus, multi-
culturalism is not only management by state and administration, but also by business
and the market. When marginalized minority culture becomes visible in dominant
society, it does not merely mean that the cultural minorities have gained increased
opportunity for self-representation. It also meets the demands of the market, as their
culture becomes a resource. The marginalized might gain audience only by capitalizing
on and commercializing one’s own difference strategically.
Multiculturalism of this brand is management of diversity where difference is
domesticated and enclosed. However, to simply give up on multiculturalism for such
contradictions, would mean also throwing away its strategic effectiveness. Such things
as cultural strategy of social minorities called identity politics, also is founded on liberal
multiculturalist stance to difference. “Identity politics” is taken up by those who are
excluded from institutional processes and historical representations so far, who are
marginalized and who align themselves under the banner of diverse cultural, social and
historical differences. By giving themselves a name, or by taking up a name given to
them, they are constructing their selves not as mere objects of others’ representation and
narrative.
This may be true of the “indigenous peoples” discourse, and the identity politics used
in debating land rights among some of the hill-dwellers in Thailand. Karen for example,
have labeled themselves indigenous people who have long lived sustainably in the
forests. The labeling of some uplanders by the lowland powers as “forest people” is now
taken up by the uplanders themselves in claiming their rights. By taking up the
standardization of culture that is imposed on them, they are able to create some space to
negotiate their rights [Yos ]. Kymlicka points out that among the varied forms of
multiculturalism, the “indigenous peoples” were the more successful in such debates. For
those who can take up this label without controversy, it does become a locus for claiming
rights to land and resource. However, this has been a problematic term to use in Thailand,
since as Toyota points out, some (such as the Karen) might more easily take on the label
than others (such as the Hmong). The more serious question as Toyota points out,
however, lies in the way a cultural community might become institutionalized [: ].
Acciaoli analyses how the Indonesian state’s sanctioning of local cultures has brought
the aestheticization of daily cultural practices through the hands of the state which
prescribes and domesticates diversity [	: ]. Local culture can thus be standardized
and appropriated through emphasis on performance and display, a misrecognition of
culture as an object, which will allow the institutionalization of cultures.
In addition to culture being institutionalized, difference is de-politicized. Diversity as
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recognized in Thailand today is one that standardizes and homogenizes each “culture” as
an entity. State recognition of diversity could be just as much a way to impose a
discourse of de-politicized difference. It might even be said that the way diverse cultures
are recognized in the North today in some ways resembles how Thainess and Thai
culture was institutionalized towards national integration in the early twentieth century.
Just as the process of defining “Thainess” in the nineteenth century was concerned with
civilizing the appearance of the state and its populations, emphasizing public displays
such as dress, comportment and manners, as exemplified in the ratthaniyom () and
the subsequent culture policy [Connors 	] so in the multiculturalist age of the
twenty-first century, standardization of various cultures can be found in recognizing
certain benign aspects of each “Culture” as representation or display, including costumes,
certain ritual practices which do not contradict Buddhism, indigenous knowledge, etc.
However, by taking up some of the elements of de-politicized “culture,” “others” can also
re-adopt their culture as defined by those in power, towards strategic identity negotiation
[Adams ]. De-politicization of differences may have allowed “others” to take them up
for identity negotiation.
Both from the point of view of those managing the diversity, as well as by those who
strategically take it up for identity negotiation, difference is stabilized by defining the
boundaries and institutionalizing and standardizing its contents. It may operate towards
de-historicizing or de-contextualizing culture in order to offer standardization as the
instrument for organizing differences. Multiculturalism is therefore highly contradictory
[Gordon and Newfield 
: 
]. At the same time the recognition of difference can be
the marking of hierarchies of value and power [Adams : ]. While emphasis on
sameness can exclude “others” who are different, emphasis on difference can be merely
confirmation of difference between those in power and those without, center and periph-
ery, or those of more or less value. At least, however, emphasis on difference made
possible varied forms of identity negotiation by those “others.” The intolerance in the
South does not refute but hi-lights the nature of the de-politicized recognition of diversity
in the North. In the South, culture has not been separated from politics, and therefore
difference remains un-tolerated.
A critical brand of multiculturalism, on the other hand, would be grounded in
grassroots alliance rather than diversity management, away from assimilation or exclu-
sion towards recognizing and accommodating diversity. Rather than standardizing of
cultures in order to accommodate them to the majority culture, which would, in effect, be
another path to assimilation, there might be multiculturalism which not only aligns the
various recognized groups, but also recognizes how intermixed and unbounded each
group is. In talking about multiculturalism in arts, education and politics, Trinh Minh-Ha
notes, “multiculturalism does not lead us very far if it remains a question of difference
only between one culture and another. Differences should also be understood within the
same culture, just as multiculturalism as an explicit condition of our times exists within
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every self. Intercultural, intersubjective, interdisciplinary. . . . To cut across boundaries
and borderlines is to live aloud the malaise of categories and labels; it is to resist
simplistic attempts at classifying, to resist the comfort of belonging to a classification,
and of producing classifiable works” [: ].
The experience in Thailand is that at the same time that participation in interna-
tional discourse has brought a liberal democratic mode of multiculturalist approach to
the minorities, the attitude remains at the same time as one of “civilizing the margins.”
One half of the purpose of this special issue is to point out this process. Thus state power
attempts to make use of the cultures of the marginalized by standardizing them, de-
politicizing them and dressing them up, and making a display of them just as had been
done to the Thai self earlier in the twentieth century. Recognition of such diversity has
not necessarily led to recognition of the rights of the people of diverse culture, but rather
to gloss over the issue. The other half of our purpose is to follow the response of the
“other.” Not only in the sense of how they are negatively affected, but also in the positive
and creative practices by which such “standardization of diversity” by the authorities
could open up paths for “others” to claim their own differences and negotiate. Because
those in power have de-politicized difference, difference can be taken up without threat-
ening the status quo. How are the “others” playing, improvising and re-defining them-
selves on the stage and script that are now open for them.

Renard’s paper gives us a good start. In order to create its “self,” it was necessary for the
Thai nation-state to define its “others” and vice versa, and therefore the two were
mutually constructed one against the other. As Thongchai points out, Thai-ness is “a
claim to legitimacy of more often than not, the official or hegemonic discourse operating
in its own particular cosmos over the subordinated or marginalized ones [:  ].”
Renard begins by mentioning pre-modern times of diversity, perhaps akin to what
Hinton (cited in Hayami’s paper) refers to as the times of “tacit understanding” from the
culturally diverse Ayutthaya. Subsequently in the late Rattanakosin period, especially
under the th reign, such understanding was taken over by a regime of “Thainess.”
Drawing upon policies especially on language and education, and making comparisons
with European nationalism and the influence of the parallel notions of “sameness” in the
administration of the period, Renard in effect argues how difference, and others, were
constituted concomitant to these policies.
Baba’s paper deals with a cross-section of local cultural revival and a formation of a
standardized culture of the “elderly” (defined by this officially designated term puu suung
ayu) through efforts of the National Culture Council and the Public Welfare Department.
The paper is also a precious piece that examines ethnographically what aging is bringing
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to local Thai society. The Tai Lue in Nan Province perform rituals for the memory of
their ancestral land across the border in China. Within the trend of local cultural revivals
mentioned above, the Tai Lue communities in Nan have modified and elaborated their
ritual, as documented in Baba’s previous works. However, now with changing role of the
elderly and state’s recognition of the problems of aging, added to this is what might be
called “the culture of the elderly” which is in many ways imposed and standardized.
There is some space, however, for cross-overs between the Tai-Lue self-representation
and this standardized culture of the elderly. Formation of the “culture of the elderly” is
at once a standardized representation of a state-formed category, and yet, in the context
of local community and ritual, it provides an arena for performing as Tai-Lue. On the one
hand there is standardization of “Thai” cultures in the North in general, and a formation
of a homogenized “elderly culture,” yet, specific Tai-Lue performances over-write these.
Wang’s paper addresses a trans-national community of the Yunnanese Chinese
known in Thailand as chiin haw. The term actually covers both the Han Chinese who are
associated with the Kuomintang army, most of whom migrated after the s, as well as
the Muslim Yunnanese who have been known locally as caravan traders and who had
formed some settlements on Thai territory by the end of the nineteenth century. In the
context of the Communist threat in the hills in the s, and the Thai government’s
special treatment of the Kuomintang Han Yunnanese, the Muslims were almost rendered
invisible, even as they had increased in numbers as transborder refugees, settled and
made living on Thai terrain. In this context, the Muslim Yunnanese have gradually
found new ways of re-defining themselves as Thailand’s more visible “other” by building
mosques and religious networks to form Muslim communities that extend over the
border. Based on recent extensive fieldwork across the border, Wang discusses the
migratory processes of the Muslim Yunnanese, and their changing relationships towards
the KMT and the Thai government. Their self/other definitions have evolved through
changing political and social contexts on Thai territory.
The Tribal Research Center (later Institute) was instituted by the state in response to
the same socio-political conditions as that which were behind the special treatment of the
KMT Yunnanese in the same hill areas as inhabited by the “hill tribes.” Kwanchewan
follows the fate of the TRC, inaugurated with fanfare in , and closed inconspicuously
in , and looks at its role in the research and policy formation towards the hill tribes
during those years. While there were many contradictory aspects within the TRC/TRI
which initially had its role in research defined by an academic with interest in applied
work (i. e. Geddes), and yet was under the government agency (Ministry of Interior in the
beginning). Throughout this process, the TRI’s activities have been primarily defined by
the relationship between the state, foreign funding agencies, and foreign advisors. This
tripartite relationship was effective from TRI’s foundation and the designation of “hill
tribes” and the “hill tribe problems.” Amid increasing interest in the hills as reflected in
academic interests and NGO activities, the TRI was quietly closed. In the state perspec-
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tive, the “hill tribe problems” as they had defined, have successfully been solved, and
therefore the TRI had lost its raison d’être. Yet, Kwanchewan points out, this does not
mean there are no longer problems for those who had been designated as “hill tribes” by
the state.
The Karen were also counted among the hill tribes and were the targets of the
policies initiated at the same time as the founding of the TRC/TRI. Hayami takes up the
evolving discourse regarding the Karen over a century, since the earlier recognition as
forest peoples (chaw paa), to being included among the trouble-making hill tribes (chaw
khaw), then towards making their own claim as Karen (pga k’nyau). Rather than being an
exercise in discourse analysis, the purpose of this first half of the paper is to see how
elements of those very discourse that was constructed among administrators, academics,
NGOs, etc. have then been taken up by the Karen themselves in claiming their rights,
which is demonstrated in the case of an eco-tourism venture in the latter half of the paper.
In the past two decades, Karen have found ways to voice their own demands, by
strategically drawing upon existing discourse on themselves. Through analysis of a
particular case of an eco-tourism endeavor, Hayami demonstrates that it is not merely
Karen taking up elements of a standardized culture and thereby seeking voice within the
hegemonic discourse upon themselves. Rather Karen in diverse positions and locations
are drawing upon multiple levels of “self/other” definitions to seek legitimate position in
the politically ridden landscape in Northern Thailand in which they are marginalized as
the benevolent forest-dweller.
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